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SURVIVAL OF A FRONTIER PRESIDIO:
ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE SUBSIDY AND
PRIVATE CONTRACT SYSTEMS, 1680-1702
by WILLIAM R. G ILLASPIE

T

last two decades of the seventeenth century were critical
years in determining the eighteenth-century destiny of the
entire breadth of the Spanish borderlands in North America.
Overshadowing the outcome of the international rivalry over
the continent were three changing tenets in international law
during the last third of the seventeenth century. The first was
Spain’s acceptance of “freedom of the seas” in place of mare
clausum (closed sea) whereby she had sought exclusivism of the
waters adjacent to its territorial holdings. Another changing
tenet, to Spain’s advantage, was the European abandonment of
“no peace beyond the line” (of demarcation) whereby aggressive
acts committed in America would have no effect on peaceful relations among the European powers. Privateers had used this
tenet to their advantage, as well as had Spain’s rivals in Europe,
and would continue to do so into the early eighteenth century.
The third, and most significant change, was Spain’s acceptance
of a new tenet, uti possidetis (as you now possess), whereby
“effective occupation alone gives valid title to colonial lands and
the rights acquired by prior discovery are only effective if they
are followed up by settlement.“1 Formalized by treaties, the most
important was the Treaty of Madrid, signed in 1670. Under it
Spain recognized the English settlements in America on the
condition that they would not engage in contraband trade with
the Spanish dependencies. The boundary between English Carolina and the Spanish Florida provinces was fixed on a line
running due west from a point in Port Royal Sound approximately sixty miles south of Charleston.2 By this time England and
HE

William R. Gillaspie is professor of history at Memphis State University,
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1. A. B. Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1699
(London, 1933), 334-35.
2. At the time, Spain divided Florida into four provinces: Guale, located in
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France posed the major threats to the former Spanish exclusivism,
but England would prove to be the most successful in adjusting
to this new tenet.
Lacking the population, and as a means of economizing, the
Spanish crown continued using the presidio-mission system as a
means to expand and defend the borderlands.3 The twenty-year
interim, 1680-1700, decided the state of preparedness of the
Spanish borderlands as the War of the Spanish Succession (17001715) extended into North America where it was called Queen
Anne’s War. The most serious and dramatic extension of that war
would be the siege of St. Augustine in 1702. Using the European
war as an excuse, Governor James Moore, with his Indian allies,
led an expedition from Charleston into Guale where he destroyed
Franciscan missions en route to St. Augustine. St. Augustine was
burned and looted, but Moore failed to take the Spanish fortress,
the Castillo de San Marcos, which served as a final place of refuge
for the Florida population. In an attempt to redeem himself,
Moore again led expeditions into Florida, 1703-1708, with the
Franciscan missions in Apalache as his principal targets. He
virtually eradicated the few remaining missions and committed
atrocities against the friars themselves.4 During the two decades
prior to the war and the siege of St. Augustine, uncertainties and
potential crises loomed in northern New Spain and the lower
Mississippi Valley regions. These years were crucial for the very
survival of the eastern region of Spanish Florida with the presidio
of St. Augustine as the bastion of the area’s defense. The challenges of preserving the eastern borderlands appeared overwhelming.

3.
4.

eastern Georgia and the islands off Georgia’s coast; Timucua, in north
central Florida and a portion of southern Georgia; Apalache, located in
southwestern Georgia, southern Alabama, and the Florida panhandle
extending from San Marcos westward to Pensacola; and Provincia Nueva,
a scantily-populated province in southern Florida.
For the origin of the presidio, see Max L. Moorehead, The Presidio:
Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands (Norman, 1975), 3-26.
Charles W. Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702 (Gainesville,
1959), 14-61; Mark F. Boyd, “The Siege of Saint Augustine by Governor
Moore of South Carolina in 1702 as Reported to the King of Spain by
Don Joseph Zuniga y Zerda, Governor of Florida,” Florida Historical
Quarterly, XXVI (April 1948), 345-52; Michael V. Gannon, The Cross
in the Sand: The Early Catholic Church in Florida, 1513-1870 (Gainesville, 1965), 75-76; Robert Allen Matter, “Missions in the Defense of
Spanish Florida, 1566-1710,” Florida Historical Quarterly, LIV (July
1975), 32-35.
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The principal challenge was to provision Spanish Florida adequately, and the presidio of St. Augustine in particular. Theoretically, the subsidy system would have sufficed in meeting St.
Augustine’s needs. But, in fact, the more informal private contract
system, interacting with the “annual” subsidy, helped meet the
many deficiencies of the subsidy system. To further compound the
problems, Spain was laboring under the reign of the inept and
demented Charles II, the last of the Spanish Hapsburg kings.
Due largely to a depression in American trade, the economy of
Spain steadily declined. In contrast, the economy in the major
commercial centers of New Spain improved. More and more
capital of the growing merchant elite remained in Mexico City
while Havana had developed into the principal shipbuilding
center in Spanish America.5 Although Charles was incapable of
governing, some members of the ruling class of aristocrats furnished leadership bordering on statesmanship.6 This was especially evident during the years 1680-1691. Although sparse in
numbers and their efforts sporadic and limited in success, they
managed to stem the declining economy of Spain. They emerged
as the precursors of the celebrated commercial reforms of the
Spanish Bourbon king, Charles III. From 1691 until 1696 Spain
operated under a councilar government. Between 1696-1700 the
issue of succession overshadowed all else and there was virtually
no viable government.7 The policies and royal cédulas during
this period were important but represented intent. In practice, it
was left to the royal officials in New Spain, including Florida, to
pursue, modify, or evade those decrees and the Laws of the
Indies. This was due in part to slowness in communication, but
to an even greater extent to the paradox found in the traditional
and successful Hapsburg imperial policy of despotism and efficiency, in theory, and “liberty” and even license, in practice.8
5. John Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, 2 vols. (New York, 1969), II,
193, 197; Richard Boyer, “Mexico in the Seventeenth Century: Transition of a Colonial Society,” Hispanic American Historical Review, LVII
(August 1977), 456-57, 463, 478.
6. As Charles was incapable of governing, the terms crown and royal
cédulas will be used to identify the leadership of the Spanish government
and its decrees with the king serving merely as its symbolic head.
7. Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, II, 247-53, 273-80.
8. For two brilliant analyses of the Hapsburg imperial policy, see Cecil
Lionel Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (New York,
1966), 43-63, and John Leddy Phelan, “Authority and Flexibility in the
Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administration Science Quarterly, V
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One policy pursued consistently and upheld by the Spanish
Hapsburg kings was the retention of Spanish Florida. Lacking
bullion and advanced Indian populations, its vital role, aside
from the crown’s persistence in converting Indians, was based
upon its strategic location. Located on the flank of the return
voyages of the treasure fleets from Peru and New Spain, Florida
provided a place of refuge for shipwrecked crewmen. The convoy
system offered effective protection from pirates and privateers but
not from the treacherous reefs and hurricanes so prevalent along
the Bahama strait off the eastern coast of Florida. Single vessels
and the coastal settlements and missions were the principal targets
of the predators. The latter were usually of English or French
nationality. The surprise midnight attack and sacking of St.
Augustine in May 1668, by the English pirate Robert Searles,
dramatically revealed the vulnerability of the presidio. The attack, linked with the signing of the Treaty of Madrid two years
later, motivated the Queen Regent, Mariana, to order the replacement of the wooden fortress in St. Augustine with that of a
permanent stone fortress. Using coquina extensively, the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos began in 1672, was substantially
finished by 1687, and was officially completed in 1695.9 In the
meantime, the English from Charleston, in violation of the Treaty
Line of 1670, were advancing steadily southward into Guale
winning over Indian tribes at the expense of the Franciscan
missionaries. In growing numbers the Indians were showing a
preference of trade goods offered by the English traders over the
religious persuasion and training and working the fields of the
Franciscan frairs.10 But the Spanish crown deemed the French
as the principal threat.
(June 1960), 47-65. A more recent scholarly work, based almost entirely
on manuscript sources, is supportive of their hypothesis. See Amy
Bushnell. The King’s Coffer: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702 (Gainesville, 1981), 138-40.
9. Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, II, 175; Clarence H. Haring, The
Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), 325; Charles Gibson, Spain
in America (New York, 1966), 102-03, 123; Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida 1565-1763 (Washington, D.C., 1941), 14, 59-75;
Albert C. Manucy, The Building of Castillo de San Marcos (Washington,
D.C., 1942), passim; J. Leitch Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North
America (Athens, 1971), 51-59.
10. Michael V. Gannon divides the history of the Florida missions into two
periods: 1606-1675 as the “golden age,” and 1675-1763 as the period of
their “decline and ruin.” The years 1702-1708 marked the nadir of the
mission system. Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 49-83; Charlton W. Tebeau,
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The expeditions of Robert Cavalier La Salle, who reached the
mouth of the Mississippi in 1682, and led a tragic follow-up expedition from France to the coast of Texas in 1684, motivated
the Spanish crown to extend the presidio-mission system into
Sonora, southwestern Arizona, and Texas.11 The Spanish crown
mistakenly believed that the lower Mississippi Valley was much
closer in proximity to the lucrative silver mines of New Spain.
Using a more direct assault on French hegemony, the Spanish
crown ordered reconnaissance missions from New Spain and
Florida to search out the French. At one point, 1689-1690, concern over the French was so great that Spanish officials in Mexico
City and Madrid debated a proposal to abandon St. Augustine
and concentrate on Pensacola as the focal point for defense. But
wiser heads prevailed, pointing out that the English from Carolina posed a greater threat. The reconnaissance missions, nevertheless, led to the occupation and fortification of Pensacola Bay
in stages, 1694-1698. The occupation of Pensacola was a joint
undertaking entailing one of the rare instances of full cooperation between the viceroy of New Spain and the Florida governors. Spanish Pensacola, however, remained as an ineffective
barrier to foreign encroachment. The French located further
west and settled Biloxi in 1699. Although France and Spain were
allies during the War of the Spanish Succession, the French took
advantage of the confusion and occupied Mobile Bay in 1702.
Spain tacitly acquiesced, and the French acquired Louisiana by
Spanish default.12 The presidio of St. Augustine would remain as
the principal bastion for the defense of the Spanish southeast.
A History of Florida (Coral Gables, 1971), 52; Vernon W. Crane, The
Southern Frontier 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, 1956), 30-46; Herbert E. Bolton
and Mary Ross, The Debatable Land: A Sketch of the Anglo-Spanish
Contest for the Georgia Country (New York, 1968), 28-68; Herbert E.
Bolton, ed., Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia: A
Contribution to the History of One of the Spanish Borderlands (Berkeley,
1925), 149-70; John Francis Bannon, Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands
(Norman, 1964), 133-49
11. Paige W. Christiansen, “The Presido and the Borderlands: A Case
Study,” Journal of the West, VIII (January 1969), 32; Herbert E. Bolton,
Rim of Christendom: A Biography of Eusebio Francisco Kino, Pacific
Coast Pioneer (New York, 1960), 23, 29, 245; John Francis Bannon, The
Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513-1821 (New York, 1970), 41, 65-67, 102;
Bannon, Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands, 120-22, 212-25; Herbert E.
Bolton, ed., Spanish Exploration in the Southwest 1542-1706 (New York,
1963), 311-422.
12. William Edward Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region
of the United States, 1678-1702: The Beginnings of Texas and Pensacola
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Unlike the more developed presidios in the Caribbean islands,
where large numbers of civilians resided, the frontier presidio of
St. Augustine was strictly a military town. But the population
and size of St. Augustine far exceeded the mere frontier garrisons
in the southwest. Its structure of government was simple. All
power was theoretically vested in the governor who technically
served under the viceroy of New Spain.13 But in practice the
governor acted independently of his superior in Mexico City. The
governor’s powers were not absolute but checked by two treasury
officials, a treasurer and accountant, who were responsible for the
collection of duties and the royal treasury. In addition to their
fiscal responsibilities, the treasurer doubled as a supply officer,
and the accountant served as a keeper and interpreter of the royal
cédulas and the Laws of the Indies. The treasury officials served
as a check on the powers of the Florida governor in much the
same way as the audiencias (judicial and advisory bodies) functioned as a restraint on the viceroys.14 The second in command
was the sergeant major who possessed great but hidden powers.
He succeeded the governor if the latter died in office or left before
his successor arrived. The governors often complained of the
sergeant major’s excessive influence over the presidio’s population
and favored abolishing the position and letting the incumbent
governor designate his interim successor.15 The governors were
(Freeport, N.Y., 1971), 31, 247-315; Charles W. Hackett, George P.
Hammond, and J. Lloyd Mecham, eds., New Spain and the Anglo-American West, 2 vols. (New York, 1969), I, 81-102; Henry Folmer, FrancoSpanish Rivalry in North America, 1524-1763 (Glendale, Calif., 1953),
143-44, 155-66; Laurence Carroll Ford, The Triangular Struggle for
Spanish Pensacola, 1689-1739 (Washington, D.C., 1939), passim; Irving
Leonard, ed., Spanish Approach to Pensacola, 1689-1693 (Albuquerque,
1939), I, 5-70.
13. Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, 4 vols. (Madrid, 1756),
Libro 3, Titulo 2, Ley 6 (hereinafter Recopilacion); John Jay TePaske,
The Governorship of Spanish Florida 1700-1763 (Durham, 1964), 5-7;
Gibson, Spain in America, 191.
14. Lillian Estelle Fisher, Viceregal Administration in the Spanish-American
Colonies (New York, 1967), 28, 82, 98-100; TePaske, Governorship of
Spanish Florida, 7; Gibson, Spain in America, 94; for a major contribution to the study of administrative functions of the treasury officials in
Spanish America see Bushnell, King’s Coffer; crown to treasury officials,
December 30, 1692, Archivo General de Indias, 58-1-22/262, Seville, microfilm copies in the John B. Stetson Collection, P. K. Yonge Library of
Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville (hereinafter AGI);
Diego de Quiroga to crown, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-13/8; Joaquin de
Florencia to crown, June 28, 1694, AGI 54-5-19/131.
15. Recopilacion, Libro 5, Titulo 2, Ley 49; Luis R. Arana, “The Spanish
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transient, peninsulares (born in Spain), and usually inexperienced. But the treasury officials, sergeant major, and company
commanders, all of whom were criollos (those of Spanish descent
born in America), formed a continuous corporate body and
emerged as the nucleus of a criollo aristocracy. Although the
royal officials’positions were not supposed to be hereditary, the
Menéndez Márques family had monopolized the position of
accountant. The family members were descendants of Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés, the founder of St. Augustine. Tomás
Menéndez held the position of accountant from 1673 until his
death in 1706. His son, Fernando, succeeded him as interim
accountant. The crown confirmed his appointment in 1711, and
Francisco maintained the position for another twenty years,
during which time he solicited the crown to appoint his son upon
his own death.16
As was the case of the other presidios of New Spain, Spain
furnished the presidio of St. Augustine with its sole means of support through the payment of an annual subsidy paid by the viceroy of New Spain. The subsidy consisted of pay for the soldiers
and supplies, including food, purchased by the soldiers from their
pay. By the mid-1630s the annual subsidies for the presidios
throughout the entire viceroyalty of New Spain had reached
400,000 pesos. The amount of the subsidy for each presidio depended upon its dotación (authorized strength). In 1678 the
dotación of the presidio of St. Augustine amounted to 300 men
with an annual subsidy of 48,000 pesos. By 1660 the subsidy rose
to 67,000 pesos, but included the Franciscan friars, retired soldiers
and other military “ineffectives,” and soldiers’widows, many of
whom were heads of families. The crown increased the dotación
to 350 in 1679, and 355 in 1688, where it remained until the
eighteenth century. By 1700 the subsidy reached 100,000 pesos,
but about twenty-five per cent was designated as payment for back
subsidies in the arrears. Interdependence between the subsidy and
local enterprise was apparent. Without the subsidy the presidio
Infantry: The Queen of Battles in Florida, 1671-1702” (master’s thesis,
University of Florida, 1960), 37; Juan Marquez Cabrera to crown, June
28, 1683, AGI 54-5-11/107; Quiroga to crown, August 1689, AGI 54-515/70.
16. Juan de Ayala to crown, April 22, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/90; Francisco de
Corcoles to crown, March 20, 1711, AGI 58-1-28/94; Francisco Menendez
to crown, February 23, 1720, AGI 58-1-34/39 and July 16, 1722, AGI 58-134/37; Antonio de Benavides to crown, August 3, 1719, AGI 58-2-4/26.
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of St. Augustine could not have survived.17 Conversely, had the
presidio been totally dependent upon the subsidy, the presidio
would have expired.
The views of the state of conditions within the presidio during the twenty-year span, 1680-1700, were filled with contradictions. The terminology used by the sources to describe conditions
at the presidio ranged from the extremes of “miserable,” “povertystricken,” and “critical,” to “golden age” and “prosperity.” Without exception, the governors used the former terms of adversity
to describe conditions. They often exaggerated the plight of the
presidio to justify infractions of the royal cédulas and the Laws
of the Indies. But there was a contrast in the general economic
conditions between the decade of the 1680s and that of the
1690s. In the decade of the 1680s the population increased, and
the presidio enjoyed relative prosperity compared to earlier years.
This was due in part to the influx of wealth and labor needed for
the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos. The decade corresponded with the development of a booming cattle industry.
The largest cattle ranch, called the hacienda de la chua (ranch of
the sinkhole), was located in north central Florida near present
day Gainesville. The family of Tomás Menéndez the accountant,
owned and operated the ranch. But it took energetic force and
perseverance of the governor to assure that much of the beef
would be sold in St. Augustine and not shipped elsewhere. The
Franciscan missions also helped sustain the presidio. Their
Indian charges, especially in Apalache, produced mostly maize
supplemented by vegetables, beans, and some wheat. But the
residents of St. Augustine much preferred wheat and beef over
the maize grown at the missions. Within the town of St. Augustine fruit, including oranges, lemons, limes, figs, and peaches, was
available. To compensate for shortages of food contraband trade
17.

Recopilacion, Libro 3, Titulo 9, Ley 7, 10; Jeanette T. Connor, trans. and
ed., Colonial Records of Spanish Florida: Letters and Reports of Governors, Deliberations of the Council of the Indies, Royal Decrees, and
other Documents, 2 vols. (Deland, 1930), II, 245; Lynch, Spain under the
Habsburgs, II, 199-200; junta of war to crown, October 10, 1662, AGI
58-2-2/9; Benavides to crown, January 20, 1719, AGI 58-2-4/21; Arana,
“Spanish Infantry,” 20; TePaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 5-7;
Theodore Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: St. Augustine,” Hispanic American Historical Review, LIV (August 1974), 416; Bannon, Bolton and the
Spanish Borderlands, 103.
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with the English and Dutch traders, during both decades and into
the eighteenth century, was a common practice.
By the 1690s a period of economic decline set in, and ranchers
began smuggling out large quantities of beef and hides to Havana
by way of the Suwanee River. The governors also complained
that the Franciscan missions were becoming increasingly unreliable. The Franciscans were selling only a limited amount of
their produce in St. Augustine at exorbitant prices and exporting
larger quantities elsewhere in return for church ornaments. Whatever the discrepancies, at no time was there a sustained effort to
establish permanent, enterprising settlements throughout the
provinces, thus transforming Florida into a self-sustaining unit.18
While a distinction can be drawn in the general economy of the
two decades, in human and social terms living conditions remained fundamentally the same. During both decades a wide gap
prevailed between the few elite and the many.
The few of the gentlemanly class, the hidalgos, included the
governor, treasury officials, and officers (sergeant major and company commanders). Amy Bushnell has written amusing accounts
of the pretentiousness which existed among the hidalgos. Preoccupied in their struggle to keep up appearances, lavish ceremonies became the most important order of business. The
hidalgos made every effort to distinguish themselves from the
plebeians and Indians. Above all special attention was given to
wearing apparel. Possession of jewelry, expensive furnishings,
18.

For various perspectives among researchers on prevailing conditions and
conflicting views over the periodization of the presidio’s history, see
Charles W. Arnade, “Cattle Raising in Spanish Florida,” Agricultural
History, XXXV (July 1961), 119-22; Bolton, Debatable Land, 76; Amy
Bushnell, “The Menendez Marquez Cattle Barony at La Chua and the
Determinants of Economic Expansion in Seventeenth Century Florida,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, LVI (April 197S), 408, 423; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 76, 80, 158; Theodore Corbett, “Population
Structure in Hispanic St. Augustine, 1629-1763,” Florida Historical
Quarterly, LIV (January 1976), 270; John R. Dunkle, “Population
Changes as an Element in Historical Geography of St. Augustine,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (July 1958), 3-10; Michael V. Gannon,
“Conflictos Entre Iglesia Y Estado En Florida: La Administration Del
Gobernador Don Juan Marquez Cabrera, 1680-1687.” in Antonio Acosta
and Juan Marchena, eds., La Influencia de España en el Caribe, la
Florida y la Luisiana, 1500-1800 (Madrid, 1983), 211-34; Robert Allen
Matter, “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Mission,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, LII (July 1973), 24, 27, 36-38; Matter,
“Missions in the Defense of Spanish Florida,” 30-32; TePaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 7.
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using expensive wax in place of charcoal, and the use of servants
and slaves were recognized status symbols. Securing these expensive luxuries required a proliferation of graft and profiteering.19 In contrast, most persons in St. Augustine lived in poverty.
Besides the native Floridian Indians, “who always lived on a
bare subsistence level,” historians identify the most needy as those
who served as the labor force used to construct the Castillo. They
included Indian conscripts, many of whom were brought in from
Mexico, black slaves, convicts, and Mexican and Cuban “ne’er do
wells.” Most criollos, as well, experienced harsh living conditions.
The widows and their families and the entire garrison of enlisted
men existed under a relentless system of debt peonage. A newlyarrived vicar, Alonso de Leturiondo, described the “near-nudity
of the soldiers in the Castillo, who have only congas [breechcloths] to cover their private parts, who wander in the streets
begging for money, and look like men who have come forth
from dungeons.“20 Real shortages of all supplies, including food,
existed. Otherwise the numerous perilous sea missions and transatlantic crossings would have been unnecessary and never undertaken. The effectiveness, readiness, and fate of the St. Augustine
presidio depended on the subsidy and private contract systems.
Each year the governor of Florida appointed a subsidy collector granting him a daily allowance ranging from two to four
pesos. Upon his arrival in Mexico City, the collector presented
the viceroy a certification denoting the authorized strength of the
presidio. When the viceroy issued a warrant from the royal
treasury the collector contacted merchants and purchased those
supplies designated by the Florida governor and treasury officials.
According to the Laws of the Indies, the viceroy and merchants
were to sell the supplies at moderate prices. From Mexico City
the supplies were transported to the point of embarkation at
Vera Cruz. The Florida collector was required to wait until the
collectors of the subsidy from Havana, Puerto Rico, and Santo
Domingo had purchased their supplies and were ready to depart.
From Vera Cruz they sailed in convoy, accompanied by a war
vessel, until their arrival at Havana where they separated and
sailed to their respective presidios. The most dangerous part of
the mission was between Havana and St. Augustine. Pirates and
19. Bushnell, King’s Coffer, 15, 21-29.
20. Gannon, “Conflictos Entre Iglesia Y Estado,” 211-34.
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privateers infested the area where they waited to pick off single
vessels. Once in St. Augustine the balance of the subsidy not
used for purchasing supplies represented the meager pay of the
military personnel. The specie was locked in a chest from which
only the governor could issue a warrant for its withdrawal. The
treasury officials stored and maintained the supplies in the royal
warehouse located within the Castillo. From their pay the soldiers
purchased their food, clothing, and other needs from the treasury
officials.21 Theoretically, the subsidy was adequate, but in practice
it failed to sustain the presidio.
Delays in collecting all or even a part of the subsidy from the
viceroy constituted the major foible in the system. The excuses
used by the viceroys were either the discovery of errors in the
certification of the dotación or the inadequacy of a ship to transport the supplies back to St. Augustine. The viceroy lacked the
hard specie to satisfy the requirements of the entire viceroyalty.
It became a matter of priority. The viceroy’s first concern was to
supply the needs of those regions directly under his supervision.
The delays became so lengthy that the Florida subsidy collector
had to agree to only a part of the subsidy most of which was in
the form of supplies. In many cases the supplies included superfluous items not included in the collector’s instructions. The original price of the merchandise represented only a part of the total
cost. By the time freight had been paid between Mexico City and
Vera Cruz, and the voyage between Vera Cruz and St. Augustine,
the cost of those goods reached an excessive level. Added to the
freight was the cost of maintaining the collector. Enjoying the
excitement of Mexico City, the collector was in no rush to return
to an impoverished frontier province. The delays became so prolonged that the collectors of two separate subsidies could be
found in Mexico City at the same time. The debts owed by the
viceroy from previous subsidies mounted steadily. As early as
1662, the subsidies in arrears amounted to 202,654 pesos; by 1703,
the debt had more than doubled to 456,959 pesos.22
21.

22.

By way of comparison, the pay scale, as of 1700, was governor, 2,750 pesos;
treasury official, 1,470 pesos; sergeant major, 708 pesos; captains (depending on assignment), from 252 to 570 pesos; privates, 158 pesos.
Recopilacion, Libro 3, Titulo 9, Ley 7, 10; crown to treasury officials,
March 8, 1702, AGI 58-1-23/131; crown to Joseph de Zúñiga, March 8,
1702.
Quiroga to crown, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-13/8; Simon de Salas to crown,
June 14, 1705, AGI 58-1-27/79; Council of the Indies to crown, January
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Although the Hapsburg kings never sought to reform the
elusive subsidy system, they did adopt measures enabling the
Florida presidio to seek relief elsewhere. Since the presidio lacked
sufficient hard specie with which to bargain, credit became essential. During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the
crown authorized two additional sources of supplies within the
Caribbean, Havana and Campeche, and ordered their governors
to extend credit. Goods purchased on credit meant lucrative
profits in the form of high interest rates. For payment, the
Havana merchants depended ultimately on warrants issued by
the Florida governor from the subsidy. The Campeche merchants
were authorized to collect directly from the viceroy, who subsequently deducted the amount of the warrants from Florida’s subsidy before its release. The crown further authorized the presidio
of St. Augustine to trade directly with the Canary Islands and
Spain. Legally and illegally, the Canaries competed with Cádiz
and Seville in providing St. Augustine with both supplies and
recruits.23 In the final analysis ultimate payment depended upon
the private contract system.
The use of the private contract system illustrated the crown’s
dependence on the free enterprise system and profit-making, and
its willingness to overlook the evasion of the well-intentioned and
even altruistic Laws of the Indies and royal cédulas. The temptations of greed went unchecked. Speculation, kick-backs, bribery,
fraud, and above all, price-gouging, became common practices.
The crown regarded its overseas possessions as the personal kingdoms of the monarch, subject only to royal authority and scrutiny.
But the king also regarded them as business investments and
recognized that the development of free enterprise and profitmaking would serve him well. The best interests of church and
state could not be jeopardized, however. Consequently, theory
and practice diverged. This dichotomy of the Hapsburg imperial
policy extended throughout the breadth of the borderlands.
11, 1702, AGI 58-2-3/15; Quiroga to crown, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-13/8
and June 23, 1690, AGI 54-5-13/10, 11; Testimony relative to the payment of the subsidy for Florida, Joseph de Vaitia to crown, November
21, 1703, AGI 58-2-3/21; Corcoles to crown, April 24, 1714, AGI 58-2-4/5.
23. Recopilacion, Libro 3, Titulo 9, Ley 8, 9; crown to house of trade, June
5, 1673, AGI 58-1-22/1; treasury officials to crown, August 20, 1692, AGI
54-5-15/92; Salas to crown, June 14, 1705, AGI 58-1-27/79; Corbett,
“Migration to a Spanish Frontier,” 425.
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In the case of the northern expansion of the presidio system
in New Spain, the private contract system was used, and along
with it appeared all of the above abuses. The problems arising in
the system in that area were primarily economic and not logistic.24
During the contraction of the southeastern frontier, with the very
survival of the St. Augustine presidio at stake, the problems were
both economic and logistic. Provisioning by sea involved great
risks, both from inclement weather and the constant threat from
pirates and privateers.
Juan de Ayala y Escobar was among the most active, successful, and daring of the Florida presidio’s private contractors, and
the only one to serve in the unofficial capacity of procurador.25
Born in 1635, Ayala was assigned as a lieutenant of the Castillo
de San Marcos in 1683. He had spent his early adult life as a seaman and commander of merchant vessels sailing in the Caribbean.
By the age of forty Ayala owned his own frigate and held a commission of captain of sea and land. Envisioning an even greater
opportunity in the military, he enlisted as a lieutenant and adjutant to the sergeant major of the Havana presidio. More seaman than soldier, Ayala commanded numerous reconnaissance
missions in the Caribbean, acquainting the governors of Havana
and St. Augustine with the activities and location of the privateers. His familiarity with the trade routes, harbors, and channels
greatly enhanced his later activities as a private contractor.26
When transferred to St. Augustine in 1683, the energetic governor, Juan Márquez Cabrera, whose administration extended
from 1680 to 1687, relieved Ayala of his responsibilities as lieutenant and utilized his services as a seaman and private contractor. On the surface, the appointment of Márquez Cabrera had
24.

Max L. Moorehead, “The Private Contract System of Presidio Supply in
Northern New Spain,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XLI (February 1961), 31-32; Moorehead, The Presidio, 201-03; Chharles W. Hackett,
ed., Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and
Approaches thereto to 1773, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1923-1937), III,
290-301.
25. The sources referred to the private contractors as procuradores. A precurador was a lobbyist assigned to the Spanish court representing a township in Spanish America. He was free to enlarge upon the directives of
his-superiors. In contrast, a private contractor was charged to purchase
supplies specified by royal officials. The official title and position of
procurador did not exist in St. Augustine.
26. Junta of War to crown, March 15, 1687, AGI 58-1-20/30; 58-1-22/7;
Marquez Cabrera to crown, June 28, 1683, AGI 58-1-26/79; memorial of
Ayala to crown, March 29, 1703, AGI 58-1-27/A38.
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reflected the more enlightened leadership in Spain; he was among
Florida’s most experienced governors. Because of his distinguished
career and statesmanlike qualities, most recently as governor of
the province of Honduras, the crown transferred Márquez
Cabrera to St. Augustine. He was conscientious, stern, a reformer,
and determined to enforce the laws. Yet he was flexible enough
to bend the rules in order to meet the vital interests of the
presidio and Florida provinces. Yet, this enigmatic authority was
not able to modulate the intense and continuous opposition of
the Franciscans, cattle ranchers, and eventually the sergeant
major, Pedro de Aranda y Allevaneda. 27 By 1687, Márquez
Cabrera abruptly and dramatically deserted his post and boarded
a ship to Havana. As he was being rowed out to his ship, he
threw his baton, symbol of the governor’s authority, into the
water and cried out, “There’s where you can go for your government in this filthy place.” Sergeant Major Aranda subsequently
became interim governor of Florida.28 During the administration
of Márquez Cabrera, Ayala sailed on at least four local missions
to Campeche and Havana, and made two transatlantic crossings
to the Canary Islands and Spain.
Ayala secured contracts from individuals as well as the official
contracts with the presidio officers. He used his own credit in
addition to that of the Florida subsidy. Ayala returned from
Campeche with cargoes consisting of serge, linen for the lining
of coats, stockings, wooden buttons, and salt. From Havana
he purchased powder, munitions, salt pork, maize, and flour.
Before departing on one of his missions, in 1686, the treasury-officials were limiting each soldier and widow, including their families, to one pound of flour per day. It was under these circumstances that Ayala volunteered to undertake a relief voyage to
Havana. In spite of the growing reluctance of the Havana officials
to extend credit, Ayala, in full view of enemy ships, sailed for
Havana and returned thirty-two days later with a cargo of flour.
Based on the warrants issued by Governor Menéndez Cabrera,
27. Arnade, “Cattle Raising,” 122; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida,
77, 126; Gannon, “Conflictos Entre Iglesia Y Estado,” 211-34; Bannon,
Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands, 138.
28. Bushnell, King’s Coffer, 45, quoting Juan de Mendoza, declaration, 1687,
in residencia of Antonio Matheos, Escribania de Camara, 156-E; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 77; Gannon, “Conflictos Entre Iglesia
Y Estado,” 211-34; Antonio de Heredia to crown, March 21, 1689, AGI
53-6-4/7; Quiroga to crown, August 1689, AGI 54-1-26/1.
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Ayala grossed 12,319 pesos from these local missions.29 His transatlantic voyages were more lucrative.
In 1683 Márquez Cabrera and the treasury officials contracted
Ayala’s services to purchase lead, gunpowder, clothing, and wine
in the Canary Islands. Before sailing he had obtained a contract
from the governor of Havana as well. Leaving on June 28, 1683,
Ayala returned to St. Augustine on April 28, 1685. Upon reaching
Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, the governor contracted Ayala’s
services to transport goods from Spain. Purchasing a second vessel
at Cádiz, Ayala sailed to Tenerife with olive oil, hemp, and gypsum. When he returned from the Canary Islands he delivered
thirty-eight recruits to the Havana governor, and the supplies
and munitions, as designated in the contract, to the Florida officials. Although prohibited, Ayala had purchased certain goods,
illegally manufactured in the Canary Islands, and had returned
with seven black slaves and two Franciscans without permission
and license from the crown. After Márquez Cabrera issued a
warrant to Ayala, totaling 22,920 pesos, the accountant, Tomás
Henéndez, dutifully reported these infractions to the crown. The
government responded by ordering the accountant not to
“molest” Ayala “now, nor in the future . . . as he acted in good
faith and brought aid, thereby alleviating the misery of the
presidio’s infantrymen.”30
The major turning point in the opportunistic career of Ayala
was his second mission to Spain, 1686-1687, as a private contractor
and procurador. Once again, Governor Márquez Cabrera turned
to Ayala to secure both supplies and reinforcements for the
presidio. Due to the inroads being made by the English traders
from Carolina, and the continuous coastal raids on the missions
by the French pirate, Agramont, and his Indian allies, Márquez
Cabrera instructed Ayala to solicit the crown to increase the
dotación from 350 to 500 men. The governor noted that the effective strength of able-bodied soldiers had declined to 260. This
was the lowest number of effective combatants between 1673 and
1699. An ulterior motive of Márquez Cabrera was to bring in
29. Quiroga to crown, April 28, 1685, AGI 54-5-15/16; treasury officials to
crown, September 30, 1686, AGI 58-2-2/66; Quiroga to crown, April 18,
1692, AGI 54-5-15/89.
30. Márquez Cabrera to crown, April 28, 1685, AGI 54-5-15/16; House of
Trade to crown, March 28, 1684, AGI 54-5-15/4 and April 4, 1684, AGI
54-5-15/6; crown to treasury officials, April 7, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/15.
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more peninsulares as a counterpoise to the large majority of
criollos and the firmly-entrenched criollo aristocracy.
Ayala departed in his frigate with pelts, acquired from the
Indians, valued at 3,000 pesos with which to trade with Spanish
merchants. This was the only commodity of exportable value
from the Florida provinces. Encountering storms, which resulted
in the damage and loss of most of the presidio’s pelts, Ayala
arrived in Seville in 1687, with skins valued at only 700 pesos.
Ayala agreed not only to make up the difference, but to supply
the presidio with 50,000 pesos on his own credit. Acquiring credit
from the merchant guild (Universidad de los cargadores a las
Indias) in Seville, Ayala agreed to repay the loan with interest
after collecting the amount from the presidio’s subsidies. As a
consequence, the Spanish crown granted Ayala numerous privileges and concessions. In order to accommodate the men and
supplies for the return voyage, the crown authorized and licensed
Ayala to purchase a 150-ton ship for the presidio’s use. This ship
could subsequently be used by the St. Augustine presidio to
transport the annual subsidies from New Spain. The crown
further authorized Ayala to sell those supplies not needed in St.
Augustine to the governors of Campeche and Havana. But the
most significant concession was Ayala’s exemption from paying
the five per cent import duty, collected in St. Augustine, on the
supplies he had purchased in Spain.31
Returning with two ships, Ayala transported arms and munitions to the St. Augustine presidio consisting of fifty arquebuses,
twenty-four spears, eighteen molds for making shot for muskets
and arquebuses, 2,400 pounds of lead sheets, 5,000 pounds of
powder, 1,500 pounds of match cord, 2,500 pounds of copper used
in the ladles for loading cannon, and 4,000 pounds of cannon
balls for eight-, ten-, twelve-, and sixteen-pounders.32 Non-military
supplies included wine, olive oil, wax, serge, and linen. In meeting Márquez Cabrera’s request for an increased dotación, the
crown compromised. It authorized the formation of a third in31.

Márquez Cabrera to crown, June 4, 1684, AGI 54-5-15/7; treasury officials
to crown, September 30, 1686, AGI 58-2-2/66; Junta of War to crown,
March 15, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/7; Arana, “The Spanish Infantry,” 20; crown
to House of Trade, May 9, 1687; AGI 58-1-26/121; Junta of War to crown,
March 15, 1687, AGI 58-1-20/30; crown to House of Trade, March 22, 1687,
AGI 58-1-22/10.
32. Crown to House of Trade, March 22, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/10; crown to
Márquez Cabrera, May 26, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/31.
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fantry company of 100 men to be recruited in Spain. In reality
these were replacements for the ineffectives rather than reinforcements. The crown promoted Ayala to captain and designated him
as the new company commander. Ayala agreed to purchase the
provisions consumed by the recruits in transit. The crown ordered
the treasury officials at Vera Cruz to reimburse Ayala with interest. When the convoy reached Havana, the governor retained
twenty of the 100 recruits for his own use. At Vera Cruz the
treasury officials paid Ayala 3,300 pesos, plus 264 pesos in interest,
for provisioning the 100 men. From Vera Cruz he sailed to
Campeche, back to Havana, and then to St. Augustine.33 Ayala
returned with the newly-appointed governor of Florida, Diego de
Quiroga y Lossada. Quiroga promptly complained to the crown
that some of the eighty new recruits were as ineffective as those
whom they had been sent to replace.
Excluding the profits on goods Ayala sold in Havana and
Campeche, Quiroga issued a warrant to Ayala totaling 50,312
pesos. From the royal treasury at St. Augustine, Ayala collected
1,787 pesos for freight charges on the arms and munitions transported to St. Augustine, 36,218 pesos for supplies he purchased
in Spain for the soldiers’use, and 7,398 pesos for goods purchased
for the clergymen. On his return voyage from Havana he had
transported flour, maize, cassava, salt, tobacco, nails, and shoes,
receiving an additional 4,909 pesos, including 350 pesos in
freight.34
Throughout Quiroga’s administration and that of his successor, Laureno de Torres y Ayala, Ayala continued to sail on
numerous relief missions as a private contractor while conditions
in supplying St. Augustine deteriorated. The greatest single
disaster occurred in 1694 when an enemy ship captured the
vessel Ayala had purchased in Spain and with it the annual subsidy of 1693.35 Even before its seizure the outside sources for food
33. Quiroga to crown, August 25, 1689, AGI 54-5-12/94; treasury officials to
crown, February 1, 1689, AGI 54-5-15/65: Junta of War to crown, March
15, 1687, AGI 58-1-20/30, and March 11, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/7; crown to
House of Trade, May 9, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/23; Council of Indies to crown,
May 16, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/28; crown to House of Trade, May 17, 1687,
AGI 58-1-22/29; crown to treasury officials of Vera Cruz, May 26, 1687,
AGI 58-1-22/30.
34. Quiroga to crown, April 1, 1688, AGI 54-1-12/57; November 26, 1692, AGI
54-5-13/47.
35. Diego de Cordoba to crown, March 27, 1695, AGI 54-1-30/1.
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and supplies were becoming increasingly difficult to secure on
credit, and were lower in quality and higher in price. Flour sent
from Vera Cruz often arrived in rotted condition while the freight
and other shipping costs increased. Between 1685 and 1690 the
expenditure for flour alone from New Spain totaled over 90,000
pesos. Flour from this source consumed almost twenty-five per
cent of the total subsidy while thirty-five per cent was spent on
freight and other shipping costs.36
Havana was a more logical source for food and supplies because of its closer proximity and lower freight charges. But the
high interest rates demanded by the merchants absorbed the difference. Between 1686 and 1694 the St. Augustine presidio had
incurred a debt of 11,447 pesos. As of 1695 the Florida officials
had paid only 3,065 pesos on the debt. Due to the seizure of the
subsidy ship in 1693, two years elapsed before the Florida officials
paid anything toward reducing the debt. It required a royal decree
before the Havana governor agreed to cooperate. Once again, the
Florida governor, Torres, called upon the services of Ayala to
solicit whatever supplies he could from Havana. On March 25,
1695, Ayala entered the Havana harbor in a mastless sloop.
Within seven days the governor had loaded 385 bushels of maize
and 450 pounds of powder aboard one of his own vessels and dispatched it to St. Augustine. After being furnished with another
mast, Ayala sailed with an additional 128 bushels of maize and
450 pounds of flour.37
Securing supplies on credit in Campeche was equally difficult.
The system of payment, unlike Havana’s, depended upon the
viceroy of New Spain. The viceroy frequently refused to honor
the certifications presented by the Campeche treasury officials.
Consequently, by the 1690s, royal cédulas were necessary before
the Florida contractors could obtain anything on credit. Such a
case arose in 1692 when the crown ordered the Campeche governor to allow the Florida presidio 8,000 pesos in credit. Governor
Quiroga dispatched Ayala. The Campeche officials complied, but
the total value of the maize, cakes of wax, and cotton cloth
36.
37.

Quiroga to crown, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-13/8.
Ibid., August 25, 1689, AGI 54-5-12/94; Severino Manzaneda to crown,
September 1, 1693, AGI 54-1-28/28; Cordoba to crown, March 27, 1695,
AGI 54-1-30/1; crown to Torres and treasury officials, May 29, AGI 58-1
22/384.
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38

amounted to only 4,682 pesos . Difficulties such as these merely
enhanced Ayala’s opportunities for personal gain and to profit
from poverty. He simply applied the maxim of trade— to buy
cheap and to sell dear— ironically coined by the presidio’s namesake, the humanitarian, Saint Augustine. Ayala’s opportunistic
activities were flagrant during Quiroga’s administration.
With private capital, relatives in Havana, and contacts in
New Spain, Ayala was in the best position to bargain for and
procure supplies. As commander of his own vessel, Ayala purchased goods on his own account at comparatively inexpensive
prices, avoided freight charges, and sold directly to the soldiers
and residents of St. Augustine. With the approval of Quiroga,
Ayala deposited his goods duty free. Ayala rationalized that the
royal concession of 1687 authorized him to avoid the import
duties. In spite of the protests of the treasury officials, who correctly concluded that the 1687 concession applied only to goods
shipped directly from Spain and the Canary Islands, Ayala enlarged upon his private enterprise. Using his house as a warehouse, he began selling goods to the soldiers and residents on
credit. Once the collector returned with the subsidy, Ayala presented Quiroga with the signed notes of the soldiers and widows,
and in return the governor issued him a warrant for the full
amount payable from the royal treasury. The governor subsequently ordered the treasury officials to deduct the debts from the
annual pay of the soldiers and widows.
Ayala’s inventory was varied and profitable. It consisted of
dry goods such as silk, fine linen, silk ribbon, and understockings for the wives and widows of soldiers, and beaver hats,
sombreros, and soft leather for the men. But food was more
profitable. From Havana he imported flour and maize, of
better quality than that stored in the royal warehouse, and
charged exorbitant prices. With Quiroga’s permission he used
the presidio’s supplies and tools and laborers, supposedly assigned
to finish construction of the Castillo, to help build another
ship for his own use. 39 The treasury officials reported these infractions to the crown, and the latter ordered Quiroga to conduct
38. Treasury officials to crown, August 20, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/92; Quiroga to
crown, April 18, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/89.
39. Edgar Salin, “Saint Augustine,” Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 15 vols.
(New York, 1930), II, 315; treasury officials to crown, July 20, 1689, AGI
54-5-15/67; February 1, 1689, AGI 54-5-15/65.
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an investigation of this misconduct. Using the formula of evasion,
the governor avoided the main issues, wrote in generalities, and
reminded the crown of Ayala’s daring relief missions. “Such exploits,” he wrote, “deserve favoritism and rewards.“40 The crown
exonerated Quiroga and Ayala and instead chastised the treasury
officials: “I severely reprimand and censure you for allowing the
entry of goods without payment of duty and yielding to my
Governor and Captain-general in the matter of not confiscating
these goods. When you have knowledge of such fraud you are to
act independently of the viceroys, presidents and governors. You
are hereby warned that should this occur again you will be
severely punished. You are to enter this cédula in your books so
that your successors will be reminded of this.” What concerned
the crown was not the prohibited private sale of merchandise by
an officer at exorbitant prices, but rather its entry without payment of duties. The king’s purse had been cheated. The crown
praised Ayala for his zeal in volunteering for dangerous missions.41 It was a dispute over an appointee, in which Ayala went
over Quiroga’s head and corresponded directly with the crown,
that led to a breach between Ayala and the governor.
Having already defended Ayala’s commercial activities,
Quiroga turned to the promiscuous improprieties of Ayala’s
personal life. In the course of returning from his first voyage to
Spain in 1685, Ayala had moved his wife and ten children from
Havana to St. Augustine. Then, after his second voyage to Spain
in 1687, he transferred them back to Havana at the first opportunity, the governor charged, in order to “gain more freedom
for pursuing his scandalous affairs with the women of St.
Augustine.” Moreover, Quiroga continued, since the administration of Márquez Cabrera, the governors had issued warrants on
the royal treasury of St. Augustine, payable to Ayala, totaling
over 89,128 pesos. From this, the governor declared, he could have
easily paid the 60,000 pesos he owed his creditors in the Canary
Islands and Seville.42 It was not until Torres replaced Quiroga as
40. Crown to Quiroga, June 25, 1690, AGI 58-1-22/146; Quiroga to crown,
April 18, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/89; Ayala to crown, April 22, 1692, AGI 545-15/90.
41. Crown to treasury officials, January 1698, AGI 58-1-22/425.
42. Ayala to crown, September 11, 1692, AGI 54-5-19/124; crown to treasury
officials, December 30, 1693, AGI 58-1-22/298; Quiroga to crown, November 26, 1692, AGI 54-5-13/47.
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governor that the crown responded to the charges. Concerned
over the loose morals of its subjects, the crown reproved Quiroga
for having permitted this “unlawful connection with women”
and told Ayala to bring his wife and family back to St. Augustine
or lose his position as company commander. Ayala abided by the
crown’s will.43
Ayala continued his relief missions as a private contractor,
but his entrepreneurial activities within the presidio temporarily
subsided during Torres’s administration. It was during the latter’s
term of office that the visitation of Jonathan Dickinson, the shipwrecked Quaker, occurred in November 1696. Lulled into a false
sense of security and peaceful coexistence between the Spanish and
English, Torres unwittingly revealed to Dickinson the weaknesses
of the presidio. Dickinson was an astute observer, noting in detail
the exact locations of the sentinel houses. Under Spanish escort,
Dickinson and his party journeyed to Charleston where he passed
on this information to the English authorities before departing
to Pennsylvania.44
Torres’s governorship was only a temporary setback to Ayala
who used the time to begin his ambitious quest for the coveted
position of sergeant major, the highest military rank and potentially the most powerful position a criollo of the presidio
could fill. This was the only position with enough hidden power
to circumvent the authority of the governor. He petitioned the
crown for the position in 1694. Although the Junta of War and
Council of the Indies recommended Ayala for the vacant position, the crown selected the seventy-year old and chronically-ill
Enrique Primo de Rivera. In order to solicit the position himself
Ayala sought permission from the crown to sail to Spain on
“personal business” in 1697. In 1699 the crown granted Ayala
permission to make the voyage.45 But the War of the Spanish
43.
44.

45.

Crown to Torres, October 22, 1693, AGI 58-1-22/294.
Jonathan Dickinson, God’s Protecting Providence, Man’s Surest Help and
Defense . . . Remarkable Deliverance . . . from the Devouring Waves of
the Sea . . . and also from the Inhumane Canibals of Florida (Philadelphia, 1699; reprint ed., New York, 1977), passim; Chatelain, Defenses of
Spanish Florida, 80-82; 158-59.
Ayala to crown, January 21, 1694, AGI 54-5-19/129; Council of the Indies
to crown, October 24, 1695, AGI 58-1-20/46; crown to Torres, November
23, 1695, AGI 58-1-22/337; Torres to crown, September 14, 1697, AGI
54-5-13/139; crown to Torres, June 30, 1699, AGI 58-1-22/491; Torres to
crown, March 30, 1700, AGI 54-5-13/160.
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Succession delayed his voyage until 1702. In the meantime, José
de Zúñiga y Cerda had succeeded Torres as governor.
Anticipating and forewarned of James Moore’s impending invasion, Zúñiga as his predecessors, turned to Ayala and dispatched him to Spain as his procurador and personal representative. Zúñiga instructed Ayala in writing to seek reinforcements
(the effective strength had declined to only 249), arms and munitions, and a general reform of the subsidy system. Leaving St.
Augustine in 1702, Ayala’s ship was the only one to arrive in
Spain from America in the year 1703, and was one of only four
to depart Spain for America the following year.46 It was during
his absence that Moore’s siege of St. Augustine occurred. When
news of it reached the crown, Ayala’s efforts to represent Zúñiga’s
pleas were greatly enhanced. When Ayala returned to St. Augustine, in the spring of 1705, the presidio population received him
as a savior and “father of the poor.“47 His mission was a personal
success, as well as one which would temporarily bring relief to
the presidio. He returned as the new sergeant major and could
again engage in his entrepreneurial activities on an even grander
scale. Ayala would become the only hidalgo who could afford to
wear velvet and a plume in his hat. He subsequently became
interim governor in 1716. Upon the arrival of the crownappointed Antonio de Benavides, the reform-minded governor
briefly imprisoned Ayala and had him exiled to Havana in 1718.
He also conducted an investigation of the contraband trade engaged in by Ayala and his predecessors. In 1731 when the crown
dropped all charges against Ayala and the former governors,
Ayala was dead. He had died in Havana in 1727, at the age of
ninety-two. 48
The Council of the Indies had advised the first Spanish
Bourbon king, Philip V, that if the presidio of St. Augustine was
lost, the English could “arbitrarily curtail all commerce from
46.

Arnade, Siege of St. Augustine, 10; Zúñiga to crown, March 24, 1702, AGI
58-2-3/16 and March 25, 1702, AGI 58-2-4/4, 41, 42; memorial of Zúñiga
1703, AGI 58-1-27/A6, 7, 9, 11; Alonso Carnero to crown, February 1703,
AGI 58-1-27/A13; Henry Kamen, The War of the Succession in Spain
1700-1715 (Bloomington, 1969), 178.
47. Salas to crown, June 14, 1705, AGI 58-1-27.
48. William R. Gillaspie, “Sergeant Major Ayala y Escobar and the
Threatened St. Augustine Mutiny,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XLVII
(October 1968), 157, 164; memorial of Ayala to crown, March 29, 1703,
AGI 58-1-27/A38; Junta of War to Ayala, June 12, 1703, AGI 58-1-23/226.
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New Spain.“ While the presidio of St. Augustine did survive,
the early Bourbon reforms of the subsidy system, until 1750, were
more symbolic than substantive. The sources of the subsidies were
changed for more lucrative ones, but the abuses and delays were
virtually the same as under the Hapsburgs. Conditions within the
presidio deteriorated, and until the mid-eighteenth century, were
as deplorable as ever.50
What success the Spanish crown enjoyed in meeting the threats
to its borderlands, and the presidio of St. Augustine in particular,
can be attributed to the disparities between theory and practice.
Altruism gave way to pragmatism and expediency. Had not
evasion of the laws, profiteering, corruption, and maladministration been commonplace, the presidio would have expired. With
all of its shortcomings, the subsidy system, linked with the expediencies of the private contract system and contraband trade,
stabilized conditions in St. Augustine to the point that at least
it supplied the presidio with enough provisions to maintain its
survival.
49. Council of Indies to crown, November 11, 1713, AGI 58-1-30/25.
50. Gillaspie, “Sergeant Major Ayala,” 153; TePaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 82-105.
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